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The world community has introduced various legal instruments
regarding reparations for gross violations of human rights. In
Cambodia, however, reparations for those seriously and systematically
deprived of their rights by the Khmer Rouge regime remain an
unresolved issue, even after the establishment of the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea. In so
complicated a case as Cambodia’s, there are many questions regarding
the reparations issue that are left unanswered. This Article examines the
issue and offers some recommendations for a feasible and effective
reparation program for the Khmer Rouge’s victims.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On April 17, 1975, two weeks before the fall of Saigon, Phnom Penh
fell to the Khmer Rouge’s control, marking the start of the dark history
of the “Killing Fields.” The Khmer Rouge regime launched a campaign
to create a “clean social system” through which it massively abused
human rights, forcing as many as three million people to evacuate the
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cities and march into the countryside where they were forced into slave
labor, and killing anyone alleged to threaten its goals.1
More than three decades have passed, but the goal of comprehensive
reparations is still out of reach for the victims whose rights were
seriously and systematically deprived by the Khmer Rouge. The issue of
reparations has received little attention from the government and the
international community, even after the establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution
of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea
(“ECCC”).2
Is the current government legally obliged to compensate the victims
of a past regime? Who may make claims for reparations? What are the
most appropriate and feasible forms of reparations in Cambodia? These
are only some of the many questions surrounding reparations in the case
of Cambodia that remain unanswered. With a view toward determining
the Cambodian government’s obligation to make reparations and offering
some recommendations for a feasible and effective reparations program
for the Khmer Rouge’s victims, this Article tries to answer these
questions.
This Article is thus organized into five sections. In Part II, it
examines the legal obligation of the government of Cambodia and the
responsibility of those who committed the atrocities in making
reparations to the victims. Part III examines what has been done so far to
solve these issues and tries to account for the current state of inaction.
Next, Part IV identifies some bases on which to decide who should
receive reparations. Part V then assesses the most likely forms of
reparations to the victims in Cambodia. The last section offers some

1
See, e.g., The Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 52/135, Annex, ¶¶ 16, 19, 20, 30, 56, U.N. Doc. A/53/850S/1999/231 (Mar. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Group of Experts Report] (discussing forced
evacuations and other human rights abuses); Katheryn M. Klein, Bringing the Khmer
Rouge to Justice: The Challenges and Risks Facing the Joint Tribunal in Cambodia, 4
NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 549, 549, 553-54 (2006) (documenting evacuations and forced
labor).
2
The ECCC, also known as the Cambodia Tribunal, is a joint court established by
an agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia to try those accused of crimes
under the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979. See the ECCC website at http://www.
eccc.gov.kh/english (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) for more general background information
about the ECCC.
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recommendations on how compensation should be made. Translating
this right into reality remains an enormous challenge. Yet, this challenge
should be overcome, and the issue of reparations to the victims of the
Khmer Rouge should be resolved as soon as possible to ensure that real
justice is brought to the victims of gross violations of human rights in
Cambodia.
II. OBLIGATIONS TO PROVIDE REPARATIONS TO THE VICTIMS
OF THE KHMER ROUGE

The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law defines reparations as consisting of restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of nonrepetition. 3 Traditionally, restitution has been the preferred form of
reparation.4 Restitution “seek[s] to reestablish the victim’s status quo
ante,”5 including, for example, return of property, restoration of liberty,
citizenship and other legal rights, return to place of residence, and
restoration of employment.6 As the most common form of legal remedy,
compensation is the payment of money as a form of recognition of the
wrong done and to make good the losses suffered. 7 Rehabilitation
usually includes medical and psychological care as well as legal
services. 8
Satisfaction consists of, among other things,
acknowledgement of violations, full and public disclosure of the truth,
formal apologies and acceptance of responsibility, and commemoration

3

Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/147 (2005) [hereinafter U.N. Basic Principles].
4
Stef Vandeginste, Reparation, in RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: A
HANDBOOK 145, 145 (David Bloomfield et al. eds., 2003).
5
Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 451,
452 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).
6
U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 3, ¶ 19.
7
U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 3, ¶ 20; de Greiff, supra note 5, at 452; Dinah L.
Shelton, Reparations for Victims of International Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES,
PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 137,
139-40 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
8
U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 3, ¶ 21; de Greiff, supra note 5, at 452.
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of victims. 9 Guarantees of non-repetition include measures that
contribute to prevention.10
The issue of reparations is not new in international human rights and
humanitarian law. 11 Initial support for this right in international law
“could arguably be found in Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention IV
respecting the Laws and Customs of War,”12 according to which a party
violating the Convention “shall . . . be liable to pay compensation.”13
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, perhaps the greatest
achievement of the twentieth century,14 later provided that “[e]veryone
has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution
or by law.”15 Many more international agreements have been reached in
the decades following the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that
strengthened the right to reparations for victims of human rights
violations. Among these are the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; 16 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 17 the Third Geneva
Convention; 18 and Protocol I to the Geneva Convention. 19 Regional

9

U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 3, ¶ 22.
Id. at ¶ 23.
11
See, e.g., Paul M. Hughes, Rectification and Reparation: What Does Citizen
Responsibility Require?, 35 J. SOC. PHIL. 244, 245 (2004) (noting that discussions
regarding reparations have become prominent in addressing past atrocities).
12
Liesbeth Zegveld, Remedies for Victims of Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 497, 506 (2003).
13
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 3, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
14
See generally PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 199-270 (2d ed. 2003) (detailing the historical context and impact
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
15
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 8, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., at 71, 73, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
16
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 2(3) & 9(5), Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
17
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 14, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
18
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 68, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
19
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 91, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
10
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instruments also contain provisions requiring legal remedies for
violations of human rights. Article 13 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms stipulates
the rights of victims of human rights violations to claim for an effective
remedy “before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”20 The
American Convention on Human Rights entitles everyone to effective
recourse to protect against violations of their fundamental rights
recognized by the constitution “or laws of the state or by the
Convention.”21
A careful check reveals that the Cambodian government has a legal
obligation to make reparations to victims of the atrocities committed by
the Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s. Currently, Cambodia is a party to
many major human rights treaties, 22 most of which provide legal
obligations for state parties to guarantee effective remedies for victims of
20

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
13, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8 and 11 which
entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 1971, Jan. 1, 1990, and Nov. 1, 1998
respectively.
21
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No.
36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the
Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992). See also African
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (providing every individual the right to an
appeal to competent national organs against acts violating his or her fundamental rights
as recognized by the conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force).
22
To the surprise of many outsiders, Cambodia is party to many major international
human rights instruments, including: ICCPR; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment; Convention on the Rights of the Child; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Optional
Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts; and Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and
Child Pornography. For the current status of Cambodia’s participation in some major
international human rights agreements, browse the list of treaties at the United Nations
Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en
(last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
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various kinds of human rights violations. The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights calls on state parties “[t]o ensure that any
person whose rights or freedoms [of the kind recognized by the
Covenant] are violated shall have an effective remedy notwithstanding
that the violations have been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity . . . [and t]o ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce
such remedies when granted.” 23 The Human Rights Committee 24
concludes that “[w]ithout reparation to individuals whose Covenant
rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective remedy,
which is central to the efficacy of Article 2, paragraph 3, is not
discharged.” 25 Such remedies should take into account the special
vulnerability of certain categories of people, particularly children.26 A
failure to comply with this obligation “could in and of itself give rise to a
separate breach of the Covenant”27 and “cannot be justified by reference
to political, social, cultural or economic considerations.”28
The International Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination also asks state parties to provide an effective remedy for
victims of racial discrimination.29 The Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment obliges
state parties to ensure that any victim of torture "obtains redress and has

23

ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 2(3).
See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human
Rights Committee—Members, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/members.htm
(last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (“The Human Rights Committee is composed of 18
independent experts who are persons of high moral character and recognized competence
in the field of human rights.”). The Committee convenes three times a year for sessions
of three weeks’ duration in Geneva or New York. Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Committee, http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/hrc (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
25
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (Mar. 29, 2004).
26
Id. ¶ 15.
27
Id.
28
Id. ¶ 14.
29
See e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 6, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 199 (requiring state parties to
guarantee effective protection against racial discrimination for every person in the states′
jurisdiction).
24
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an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation".30 Similarly, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child at Article 39 requires all states
parties to "take all appropriate measures to promote physical and
psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim" of any
forms of violation.31
Victims of the Khmer Rouge include women and children, those
dispossessed of their political and civil rights, those suffering torture, and
those enduring racial and gender discriminations. All these victims may
arguably fall within the scope of the above-mentioned human rights
treaties to which Cambodia is a party. Precedents from the cases of
Austria, 32 Germany, 33 and Japan 34 suggest that the Cambodian
government has an obligation to seriously consider the possibility of
making reparations to the Khmer Rouge’s victims, regardless of the fact
that atrocities were committed by a former regime that was overthrown
by the current government.
While the argument above deals with the Cambodian government’s
legal obligations to make reparations to victims of the Khmer Rouge, the
Khmer Rouge leaders themselves are directly responsible for making
reparations for the crimes they committed. According to the Report of
the Group of Experts for Cambodia 35 established pursuant to General
30

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, supra note 17, art. 14(1).
31
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 39, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3,
56.
32
See Max du Plessis, Historical Injustice and International Law: An Exploratory
Discussion of Reparation for Slavery, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 624, 639 (2003) (mentioning that
Austria paid US $25 million in reparations to Holocaust survivors in 1990).
33
See Ariel Colonomos & Andrea Armstrong, German Reparations to the Jews
After World War II: A Turning Point in the History of Reparations (estimating that the
German government has paid a total of US $61.5 billion in reparations to victims of the
Nazis between 1965 and 2001), in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 5, at 390,
408.
34
See Joseph P. Nearey, Seeking Reparations in the New Millennium: Will Japan
Compensate the “Comfort Women” of World War II?, 15 TEMP. INT’L L.J. 121, 140
(2001) (describing a US $10 million government-initiated private fund to correct the
wrongs committed against former comfort women).
35
See generally Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, G.A. Res. 52/135, ¶ 2,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/135 (1998) (requesting that the Secretary-General consider assisting
the government of Cambodia by appointing a group of experts). U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan appointed a three-member Group of Experts pursuant to General Assembly
resolution 52/135 to evaluate the existing evidence to determine the nature of the crimes
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Assembly Resolution 52/135, leaders of the Khmer Rouge have “vast
amounts of wealth in the years since their ouster from power.”36 The
report recommends that the wealth of Khmer Rouge leaders convicted by
a tribunal be used as a source of compensation to the victims and that the
ECCC provide for the possibility of reparations by the defendants to their
victims.37 There exist both legal means and practical capabilities for the
victims to demand reparations from those who committed gross
violations in the 1970s.
III. A STATE OF INACTION

Three decades have elapsed since the genocidal regime of the Khmer
Rouge collapsed, yet its victims still have not received any adequate
remedial justice. 38 This indicates that the wrongs have not been
comprehensively and completely rectified and the rights of the victims
have not been fully recognized. Victims of the Khmer Rouge regime
have waited many years for reparation. Concerns have been raised by
human rights non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) but their
actions and pressures may be not strong enough to effect real change.
The United Nations Trust Funds connected to the establishment and
functioning of various tribunals have been unsuccessful in raising funds
for purposes of reparations.39 When the United Nations and Cambodia
negotiated the agreement to establish the ECCC, hope was raised for
including provisions about reparations in the Agreement. However, in a
step that Amnesty International described as “a major retreat from the

committed by Khmer Rouge leaders; and to explore legal options for bringing them to
justice. Group of Experts Report, supra note 1.
36
Id. ¶ 211.
37
See id. ¶ 212 (“The possibility of requiring defendants to pay compensation to
victims is included in the statutes of the existing ad hoc tribunals and has recently been
affirmed in the statute of the International Criminal Court.”). The report also
recommended that, “any tribunal provide for the possibility of reparations by the
defendant to his victims . . . [and] States in which Khmer Rouge assets obtained illegally
are present should explore other options for providing compensation to victims from
these assets.” Id.
38
See Klein, supra note 1, at 549.
39
Gregory H. Stanton, Perfection Is the Enemy of Justice, BANGKOK POST, June 1,
2003 (responding to Amnesty International’s criticism of the draft agreement between
Cambodia and the United Nations).
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Rome Statute,” 40 the United Nations and the Cambodian government
concluded an agreement without any such provision.
This agreement led to the promulgation of the Law on the
Establishment of the ECCC, which does not have any specific references
to reparations.
While this law limits all forms of penalty to
41
imprisonment, it authorizes the confiscation of personal property,
money, and real property acquired unlawfully by the convicted persons.42
However, the law dictates that confiscated property shall be returned to
the government, not to the victims of the Khmer Rouge regime.43 The
Internal Rules of the ECCC is the only document from this agreement
that specifically addresses the issue of reparations, but it provides that
reparations should be granted only to certain groups of victims (i.e., civil
parties) and only in moral or symbolic forms.44
Why is it taking so long for the government of Cambodia to realize
the rights of its citizens? Why has the issue of reparations to Khmer
Rouge’s victims received such modest attention from the international
community? There are some possible explanations for this state of
affairs.
First, the issue of reparation for victims of human rights violations in
general became significantly more popular only after the end of the Cold
War. 45 In the case of Cambodia, almost all efforts have focused on
seeking truth and justice as these aspects are considered prerequisites for
reparation.46
Second, after the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime, the political
environment in Cambodia remained unstable through the late 1990s.
40

Id.
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea (Council of Jurists trans.), art. 38, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/
law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
42
Id. art. 39.
43
Id.
44
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules (Rev. 4), rule
23 (revised on Sept. 11, 2009) [hereinafter ECCC Rules], available at http://www.eccc.
gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/121/IRv4-EN.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
45
Richard Falk, Reparations, International Law, and Global Justice: A New
Frontier, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 5, at 478-79.
46
See Stef Vandeginste, A Truth and Reconciliation Approach to the Genocide and
Crimes Against Humanity in Rwanda 9 (May 1998) (Inst. of Dev. Policy & Mgmt., Univ.
of Antwerp Working Paper).
41
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From 1979 to 1991, the occupation by Vietnam and the debate over who
would be the legitimate representative for Cambodia dominated the
limelight, leaving little room for discussions on reparation.47 Then from
1991 to 1997, domestic and international attention was further consumed
by the internal struggle for power in the country.48 Political stability was
only realized in 1997 just before Cambodia became an official member
of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations. 49 At that time, the
United Nations received a request from the government of Cambodia for
assistance in organizing the trial process of the Khmer Rouge.50 Since
then, attention has been mainly focused on the issue of prosecution, not
on the equally important matter of reparation.51
Third, there is a lack of political interest on the part of the
Cambodian government regarding the obligation to make reparations to
the Khmer Rouge’s victims. Although the Khmer Rouge regime was
overthrown, some people who were involved in that particular regime are
still holding power. 52 This situation contributes to making the
Cambodian authority reluctant to bring accountability to all the
perpetrators and make reparations to the victims of the 1970s massacre.

47

See Scott Luftglass, Crossroads in Cambodia:
The United Nation’s
Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal
to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L. REV. 893, 903 (2004) (explaining that the
international community was mainly interested in ensuring Cambodia’s stability in the
years following the end of the Khmer Rouge).
48
See Vannath Chea, Reconciliation in Cambodia: Politics, Culture and Religion
(recounting the peace process where different political factions struggled for power), in
RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 49, 50.
49
See DAVID W. ROBERTS, POLITICAL TRANSITION IN CAMBODIA, 1991-99: POWER,
ELITISM, AND DEMOCRACY 168-69 (2001) (discussing how some form of stability was
restored following a coup in 1997). See also Seth Mydans, Fragile Stability Slowly
Emerges in Cambodia, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2000, at 1 (describing developments in
Cambodia that suggest it is witnessing a “new era of peace and political stability”).
50
Luftglass, supra note 47, at 906; Klein, supra note 1, at 554-55.
51
After five years of long and difficult negotiation, including the six-month
deadlock because of the United Nation’s withdrawal from the talk, a final agreement was
concluded in 2003, focusing on the prosecution of a group of top leaders of the Khmer
Rouge, without any reference to reparations issues. See Luftglass, supra note 47, at 90617 (describing the efforts by the United Nations and Cambodia to establish a tribunal).
52
See Klein, supra note 1, at 554 (giving the example of Hun Sen, a former Khmer
Rouge Foreign Minister, who is currently the Prime Minster of Cambodia and has been
uncooperative in the negotiations regarding the establishment of the joint tribunal).
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Fourth, the international community and NGOs have not been
effective in changing the current lack of action and spreading awareness.
Even the victims themselves are not always aware of the rights that they
possess.53
Last is what J. Angelo Corlett called the “Objection from Historical
Complexity” 54 of a case that occurred long in the past. According to
Corlett’s line of argument, history contains so many complex situations
that it would be next to impossible to figure out all of the injustices that
would require reparations and effectively address them.55 For Cambodia,
after a quarter of a century, it seems both impractical to measure the
harms done to the victims on a case-by-case basis and enormously
expensive to restore the rights of victims that were injured so long ago.56
It is also very difficult to persuade members of a present generation that
they owe a debt to the ancestors of the claimants.57
Despite all of these hurdles, the issue of reparation to victims of
gross human rights violations in Cambodia should not stand unresolved
indefinitely. If investigation, recognition and prosecution are the
preconditions for reparation, now is the time, as these other aspects of
justice are being delivered, to proceed toward the goal of reparation.
Although the Agreement to establish the ECCC does not contain
provisions on reparation, there is a legal basis for such reparation
established by obligations in treaties to which Cambodia is a party and
by Cambodian domestic law itself. Under current Cambodian law,
victims may claim reparation in criminal cases for harm they suffered as
a result of the crimes being tried,58 and under the Internal Rules of the
53

In a survey on the attitudes of the Cambodian population conducted by the Human
Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, although nine out of ten respondents
said that reparations should be provided to the victims of the atrocities, 39% required
punishment for forgiveness while only 5% selected compensation as means to earn
forgiveness. PHUONG PHAM ET AL., SO WE WILL NEVER FORGET: A POPULATION-BASED
SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND THE EXTRAORDINARY
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 29-30 (2009). Such responses suggest that the
respondents did not attach much priority or significance to the right to compensation.
54
J. ANGELO CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT 190 (3d ed. 2006).
55
Id.
56
Falk, supra note 45, at 495.
57
CORLETT, supra note 543, at 190-91.
58
See SECRETARIAT OF THE ROYAL GOV’T TASK FORCE, OFFICE OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE KHMER ROUGE TRIALS 15 (2004), available at
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/introduction_eng/index.htm (last visited Oct. 28,
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ECCC, certain forms of reparation may be granted.59 The problem is
devising feasible and effective ways to fulfill the obligations of making
reparations. In that light, the following sections will discuss some
practical solutions regarding how reparations to victims of genocide
should be made in the case of Cambodia.
IV. POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS OF REPARATION

The first challenge is how to determine who is eligible to claim for
reparations in this case, as many of the direct victims have died. Many
of the two million people killed in the atrocities have living children and
grandchildren. Thus questions are posed: Can their offspring and
families receive reparation? Can the families of those who are still alive
receive reparation as well? These questions can only be resolved on a
case-by-case basis. Ultimately, however, there should be a general
framework to determine the recipients of reparations before proceeding
with an overwhelming number of individual claims. Fortunately, there
are many sources of international law to assist in creating this
framework. For example, Article 14 of the U.N. Convention Against
Torture provides that, “in the event of the death of the victim as a result
of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation.”60
As defined by the former European Commission on Human Rights in X
v. Federal Republic of Germany, the term “victim” includes “not only
the direct victim or victims of the alleged violation but also any person
who would indirectly suffer prejudice as a result of such violation or who
would have a valid personal interest in securing the cessation of such
violation.” 61 Similarly, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has
concluded that victims may include family members of those who
suffered violations.62 Recent decisions of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights also indicate that when victims have died, their next of
kin is eligible to recover damages; and where evidence of family ties has
2009) (stating that murder, torture, and religious persecution are crimes under Cambodian
law).
59
See supra, note 44 and accompanying text.
60
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, supra note 17, art. 14(1).
61
X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 4185/69, 35 Eur. Comm’n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 142 (1970).
62
Shelton, supra note 7, at 142.
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not been presented, family members are given a period of two years after
judgment to show proof of their relationship to qualify for damage
awards.63 A general framework should be established initially, in which
family members of all victims are eligible to claim for reparations; and
within this framework, specific solutions can be reached on a case-bycase basis.
Another issue remains, however, regarding the scope of the term
“family.” In order to address this issue, it is useful to look at the scope
applied in other cases. In Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights considered that the term “family members”
should be understood to include all persons linked by a close
relationship, including the children, parents and siblings of a victim.64
Similarly, in Blake v. Guatemala, the Court decided that all four family
members of the disappeared, his parents and his brothers, were directly
injured by Blake’s disappearance and death. 65 In Suárez Rosero v.
Ecuador and Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, the Court likewise
ordered the states to pay damages to the wife/widow and the children of
each of the victims.66 In cases after the 1990 conflict in the Persian Gulf,
the U.N. Compensation Commission determined that spouses, children
or parents of the individuals could be considered eligible for
compensation for their suffering as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990.67 Precedents established in
these cases suggest an answer as to who can claim for reparations in the
case of Cambodia. First, the direct victims of the atrocities should be
63

See Douglas Cassel, The Expanding Scope and Impact of Reparations Awarded by
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (K. De Feyter et al. eds., 2005) (noting that
the Inter-American Court has vastly expanded the remedies and measures of reparations
it now regularly orders), in OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND
SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 191, 199-200.
64
See Loayza Tamayo Case, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 42 ¶ 90 (Nov. 27,
1998) (stating that a victim's next of kin, in the anthropological sense, is not family in the
nuclear sense but rather the extended family).
65
See Blake Case, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 48 ¶ 57 (Jan. 22, 1999)
(holding that the parents and brothers were beneficiaries of the reparations as a result of
the violations).
66
Suárez Rosero Case, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 44 ¶ 113 (Jan. 20,
1999); Bámaca Velásquez Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 91 ¶ 106 (Feb. 22,
2002).
67
David J. Bederman, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Tradition
of International Claims Settlement, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 22 n.102 (1994).

290

EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 4:277

eligible for reparation. And second, eligibility should be granted to next
of kin to victims who were killed in the 1970s, or who have died since,
including parents, spouses, siblings and children of those direct victims.
Using this general approach, solutions can be reached in granting
reparations in specific cases.
V. MOST LIKELY FORMS OF REPARATIONS

Another challenge is how to ascertain what should be the most
appropriate measures of reparations in the case of Cambodia among
many forms of reparation, including restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.68 First of
all, it might be argued that restitution, given the extent of time and the
current situation in Cambodia, is not a likely option for the victims of the
Khmer Rouge. As indicated by Article 35 of the International Law
Commission Articles on State Responsibility, restitution is not the
appropriate form of reparations in cases where it is “materially
impossible.” 69 Circumstances in Cambodia have understandably
changed over the last thirty years to the extent that a return to former
places of residence or restoration of working and living environments
into those before the 1970s is neither possible nor necessary.
Rehabilitation, while being necessary, is unlikely to have much
feasibility and applicability given the number of people who really need
medical and psychological care as a direct result of the atrocities more
than thirty years ago. Measures of guarantee for non-repetition and
prevention are always important but they are long-term programs and
might not be directed toward the victims of the genocidal Khmer Rouge
regime.70
Symbolic forms of satisfaction seem to be among the most feasible
solutions. It is quite likely that symbolic measures are of lower material
cost in comparison with other forms of reparations. 71 Symbolic
reparation also constitutes a way to show respect for the victims and to

68

U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 3, ¶ 18.
Falk, supra note 45, at 483.
70
Possible measures to guarantee non-repetition appear in U.N. Basic Principles,
supra note 3, ¶ 23.
71
See de Greiff, supra note 5, at 453 (contrasting symbolic forms of reparations with
material forms, which may include some form of payments or services).
69
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express the government’s recognition of the harm suffered.72 A formal
apology, construction of monuments, establishment of memorial days,
and a firm commitment not to repeat these atrocities are not beyond the
government’s capacity. In fact, this approach seems to have been
adopted by the government of Cambodia as reflected in a statement on its
official website that reads: “It is difficult to imagine how the many
millions of Cambodian victims could receive anything more than
symbolic compensation.”73 This approach also appears in the Internal
Rules of the ECCC, which notes that reparation, if granted, would only
be in moral and symbolic forms.74
Nevertheless, efforts to make reparations should not stop at this
point, for the victims deserve more than the compensating effects of
symbolic gestures. If it is generally accepted that the harm suffered
merits the right to compensation, there should also be a form of material
reparation75 as recommended by the Group of Experts for Cambodia,76
especially given the responsibility of the convicted and the obligations of
the government as examined above.
VI. HOW COMPENSATION SHOULD BE MADE

The case for monetary reparation has been made in earlier
arguments. However, how to arrange and make compensation poses
other difficulties. What is the best reparation mechanism: judicial or
administrative? What are the financial resources out of which to make
compensation, given the low level of development of Cambodia? Is it
fair to use taxes when arguably most of Cambodian citizens now are not
responsible for those violations?
More generally, is this the
72

Id. (enumerating possible forms of symbolic reparations).
Secretariat of the Royal Government Task Force, Office of the Council of
Ministers, An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials 17 (2004), available at
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/index.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
74
ECCC Rules, rule 23 (stating that awards may include an order to publish the
judgment at the expense of the convicted person, an order to fund a non-profit activity for
the victims’ benefit, or other comparable reparations).
75
See Jaime E. Malamud-Goti & Lucas Sebastián Grosman, Reparations and Civil
Litigation: Compensation for Human Rights Violations in Transitional Democracies
(“[I]t is generally accepted that [reparations] must include some form of monetary
compensation for the harm suffered.”), in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 5,
at 539, 539.
76
Group of Experts Report, supra note 1, ¶ 212.
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responsibility of the current generation for something that happened to
their ancestors? What are the optimal forms that compensation should
take? Does cash represent the best option? Should the victims be given
the freedom to decide on its use? Should compensation be the same for
all even though victims may have suffered in various ways and to
different degrees? These issues certainly require careful thought and
deliberate discussions before a solution can be worked out. This section
does not aim to provide the best answers to all these questions. It does,
however, try to offer some recommendations which might be appropriate
in a case as complex as Cambodia’s.
First, regarding the financial resources out of which reparations can
be made; one may argue that it is primarily the obligation of the
Cambodian government. This is true in a number of cases. In the case
of Iraq’s unlawful invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the U.N.
Compensation Commission raised a fund through a tax on Iraqi oil
exports.77 Several countries have also enacted legislation and established
reparation funds that were extracted from state budgets to compensate
victims of human rights abuses committed under a previous regime. In
1990, Austria made payments of a total US $25 million to Jewish
survivors of the Holocaust. 78 Argentina also adopted reparation
legislation in 1991 to make compensation for human rights violation
victims, especially those in cases of disappearances.79 Chile decided in
1995 to use its national budget to establish a fund for implementing a
program of reparations for all peasants excluded from agrarian reforms
or expelled from their land. 80 In the same year, Brazil established a
reparations commission to compensate the family relatives of 135 armed
rebels disappearing when this country was under military rule. 81
Following the September 11, 2001 incidents, the U.S. Congress enacted
Public Law 107-42 to establish the “September 11th Victim

77

David Bloomfield, Reconciliation: An Introduction, in RECONCILIATION AFTER
VIOLENT CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 10, 16.
78
du Plessis, supra note 32, at 639.
79
Vandeginste, supra note 4, at 155.
80
See Elizabeth Lira, The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in Chile
(describing how the reparations policy set payments according to three different age
groups), in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 5, at 55, 84.
81
Vandeginste, supra note 4, at 155.
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Compensation Fund” of roughly US $4 billion, 82 which has been
subsidized entirely by the federal government.83 Germany’s enactment
since World War II of several measures to pay victims in post-war
reparation amounted to more than US $38.6 billion by the year 2000.84
These examples demonstrate that funding mainly has been raised from
the state budget.
The case of Cambodia, however, might be somewhat different from
other countries that have financed reparations. First, the number of
people who have potential reparation claims is in the millions.85 Second,
unlike the United States, Germany, Japan or Austria, Cambodia belongs
to a group of the poorest countries in the world. 86 Cambodia’s state
budget is far from being sufficient to adequately compensate victims.87
Third, due to a lack of political interest, it is unlikely that Cambodia’s
government would accept the responsibility of compensating victims.
Fourth, as described above, those convicted of atrocities are also
responsible for compensating victims, and they are, in fact, at least
partially capable of doing so.88 Last, the international community may
also contribute to the fund. A preliminary conclusion of this analysis

82

The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230, 237 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2001)); see Samuel Issacharoff &
Anna Morawiec Mansfield, Compensation for the Victims of September 11 (contrasting
the compensation scheme for September 11th with other initiatives by noting the
scheme’s absence of “notions of justice, reconciliation and restitution”), in THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 5, at 284, 284-85, 293.
83
Id. at 285.
84
Colonomos & Armstrong, supra note 33, at 408.
85
See Group of Experts Report, supra note 1 ¶ 19 (noting that up to three million
people were forced to evacuate cities and were marched into the countryside); see also
Klein, supra note 1, at 549 (stating that three million people were forced into slave labor).
In contrast, Brazil’s reparation program had only a few hundred potential claims. See
supra, note 81 & accompanying text.
86
See United Nations Statistics Division, National Accounts Section, United Nations
Statistics Division — Demographic and Social Statistics, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/
demographic/products/socind/inc-eco.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (reporting that
Cambodia’s per capita GDP is US $598).
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The Cambodia State budget in 2008 had revenues of US $1.274 billion. CIA—
The World Factbook—Cambodia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/cb.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
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The top leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime are said to have a great deal of
wealth, mostly from their benefits from timber and gem concessions. Group of Experts
Report, supra note 1, ¶ 211.
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recommends that the fund should rely on a combination of various
sources such as Cambodia’s state budget, the perpetrators’ wealth, and
contributions of the international community.
The second recommendation concerns managing and distributing the
compensatory funds. Judicial compensation to individual claimants may
not be possible in this case because it may take too much time and prove
too costly. This is especially true because of the current Cambodian
judicial system, number of people who were victimized, and number of
family members who have suffered from the death or injuries of their
loved ones. Judicially compensating individual victims for atrocities
committed so far in the past is also extremely complicated. Each victim
suffered differently and has a different number of dependants who also
uniquely suffered from the atrocities.
Harm assessment is never an easy process, 89 and it is especially
difficult in this case. Among the victims, many people were killed; those
who managed to survive suffered mental or physical injuries. In order to
judicially compensate on an individual basis, authorities must investigate
and compare between different types of suffering. For example, the
government would have to decide whether those who were killed by
torture or forced labor, or those suffering from mental harms or bodily
injuries, should receive the same level of compensation. Since many
things have happened to these families between then and now, it is
difficult to determine the degree each family suffered from the death of
their loved ones. In addition, the disadvantages that family members
currently suffer are the result of a long chain of causes through more than
one historical injustice.90
To correctly measure the degree of suffering in cases happening
more than thirty years ago is nearly impossible. Such a task would also
inevitably disaggregate victims.91 Differences in the investigation and
89

See Colonomos & Armstrong, supra note 33, at 408, 410-11 (explaining the
challenges faced by the German government in evaluating the “subjective dimension” of
various types of harms).
90
See Janna Thompson, Historical Injustice and Reparation: Justifying Claims of
Descendants, 112 ETHICS 114, 117-18 (2001) (describing the difficulty of justifying
causal relation between past injustice and present harms of African-American slave
descendants).
91
See de Greiff, supra note 5, at 458 (“A case-by-case procedure for settling
reparations claims disaggregates victims because of unequal access to courts, and of the
unequal awards courts make.”).
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assessment would lead to different judicial awards. This may send an
unintentional message that violations of some victims’ rights are more
significant than the same violations of rights against others, thereby
resulting in a “hierarchy of victims.”92
Given the analysis above, an administrative approach, as opposed to
judicial approach, and collective measures, as opposed to individual
measures, are more feasible and appropriate for Cambodia. First,
administrative and collective measures have the advantage of reaching a
greater number of former victims. 93 In contrast, under the judicial
approach, courts may easily become overloaded with a huge number of
reparations claims and may be incapable of effectively handling all
cases.94 Second, administrative and collective measures may have less
risk of incorrectly assessing the victims’ sufferings. 95 Third, these
measures avoid limitations or mistakes concerning the range of
beneficiaries. 96 Fourth, collective measures usually do not include
financial considerations alone. Instead, they might also include other
aspects such as granting victims the right to express their experiences of
victimization or the full disclosure of the truth.97 Last, unlike the judicial
approach, administrative and collective measures do not focus only on
the past; they also look forward to the future.
One can argue that the administrative and collective approaches will
dissatisfy specific groups within the Cambodian community.
Nonetheless, it should be remembered that there is no perfect solution
that will satisfy people from all walks of life. In this regard, the case of
South Africa offers a good example to contemplate. For Apartheid
victims, the South African government established an administrative
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Id. at 458.
Vandeginste, supra note 4, at 158.
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uniform award consistent with an injury group.98 Such uniform awards
of compensation were also made to Japanese Americans for the
internment they suffered during the World War II.99 In a very interesting
collective measure case, victims of the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990 were classified into six distinct categories and were
awarded compensation based on this classification.100
The third recommendation concerns the many questions regarding
the specific forms that compensations should take. Should cash be the
only option? Should recipients use their received money for whatever
purposes they choose? Again, the compensations made in South Africa
can be useful in guiding the compensatory regimes for Cambodian
victims of gross human rights violations. After the collapse of the
Apartheid regime in South Africa, victims were offered a “services
package”—a combination of rehabilitation and compensation.101 In this
case, the Reparation and Reconciliation Committee decided to give the
recipients the freedom of choice by recommending financial reparations
at levels that would enable reasonable access to essential and basic
services.102 It thus helped create favorable conditions for the victims to
utilize their compensations and for the project to achieve its more general
objectives. 103 This might suggest a similar solution in the case of
Cambodia to the question of deciding the form of compensations.104
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Ginger Thompson, South Africa to Pay $3,900 to Each Family of Apartheid
Victims, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at A7 (reporting that the South African government
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VII. CONCLUSION

The issue of reparation to victims of gross human rights violations
has been shaped and defined by both state practice and major
international instruments on human rights, including humanitarian and
criminal laws. As argued in this Article, there exists an obligation on
part of the Cambodian government to seriously consider the possibility
of making reparations to the Khmer Rouge’s victims, regardless of the
fact that the atrocities were committed by a former regime that the
current government overthrew. The Khmer Rouge leaders themselves
are also directly responsible for making reparations for the crimes they
committed. Victims of grave abuses in Cambodia have their legitimate
rights to reparation.
However, translating these rights into reality presents an enormous
challenge, given that the atrocities took place so far in the past. The
Cambodian government must make several strategic choices and
confront a wide range of issues. Overcoming these challenges and
resolving the issue of reparation to the victims of Khmer Rouge must be
done as soon as possible, together with truth, justice, and prevention.
Along that line, this article has made some practical suggestions on how
to overcome these challenges toward the goal of making fair reparations
to these victims.
Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, the U.N. Compensation
Commission has set an important example that suggests international
assistance can help make victims’ desire for reparations a reality.
Without the international community’s participation, one might question
whether the Iraqi government would have ended up making reparations.
This may also be the case in Cambodia. It is unlikely that the
Cambodian government will try to make reparations if there is no
international influence, cooperation, or assistance from the outside.
More pressure, therefore, should be put on the Cambodian government.
On the other hand, the international community could also help
provide human resources, as well as assessment and management skills
in implementing the reparation program. In this process, international
and national NGOs have an important role to play. Specifically, the
NGO community can help support the growth of civil society, sponsor
education, and raise awareness at the grassroots level. They can also act
as coordinators working with the government in assisting the victims and
mobilizing financial resources. In the case of German reparations to the
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Jews after the World War II, it was the American civil society that
promoted the idea of reparations and assisted the Jewish efforts in
obtaining compensation. 105 In the case of South Africa, it was
representatives from peace and conflict resolution NGOs that made
various inputs concerning the need for reparations in the final policy of
South Africa.106 With their participation in the process, we have more
reasons to hope for appropriate reparation to be finally made for the
victims of the Khmer Rouge.
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